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Abstract 
 
Le partnership pubblico-private (PPP) sono uno strumento ora ampiamente diffuso. Dai 
piccoli servizi comunali alle grandi infrastrutture, il rapporto economico-giuridico che le PPP 
instaurano tra ente pubblico e società privata porta ad uno scambio di risorse che, se 
controllato ed eseguito correttamente, può produrre significativi surplus sociali ed economici.  
Questo lavoro si pone come primo obiettivo quello di presentare un panorama aggiorato sulle 
possibili forme che possono essere  assunte in una PPP; inoltre, nella presente tesi trova 
spazio anche un’analisi sulle principali caratteristiche che formano questa particolare forma di 
appalto. Tutto ciò è diretto a delineare il vero e proprio fulcro della tesi: una meta-analisi sui 
casi di  PPP riguardanti infrastrutture o servizi legati alla costruzione o al mantenimento di 
esse, che sono stati descritti dalla letteratura rilevante, allo scopo di comprendere quali sono le 
determinanti del loro successo. In particolare, scopo principale di questa analisi è verificare 
l’impatto di determinate caratteristiche della PPP sulla probabilità di ottenere un risultato 
positivo in termini di sostenibilità economica, sociale, ambientale e performance innovativa. 
Attraverso la creazione di un data set dettagliato, comprendente tutti i 43 casi analizzati, 
selezionati a partire dalla letteratura inclusa nel database ISI Web of Science, il più 
comunemente usato dalla letteratura scientifica, a partire dagli anni ‘90, si è arrivati alla 
definizione di una serie di variabili caratteristiche delle PPP, che possono spiegare lo sviluppo 
positivo delle partnerships a partire dagli anni Novanta. 
I dati sono un insieme di variabili dummy (assenza/presenza). Essi sono stati processati 
eseguendo una regressione logistica. Successivamente, i risultati ottenuti sono stati 
commentati e rivalutati sulla base delle previsioni emerse nel capitolo iniziale e hanno portato 
a buone considerazioni soprattutto nella valutazione della sostenibilità economica delle PPP. 
I risultati dell’analisi mostrano che le variabili che abbiamo individuato sono in grado di 
identificare alcuni ingredienti che definiscono la probabilità di successo economico delle PPP. 
In particolare, troviamo che la struttura della SPV (special purpose veichle), del 
finanziamento e della forma contrattuale alla base del progetto sono positivamente correlate 
con la probabilità di ottenere un risultato economico positivo. Non si identificano, invece, 
delle variabili in grado di spiegare le ragioni della sostenibilità sociale o del potenziale 
innovativo delle PPP. Questi probabilmente sono dovuti a fattori idiosincratici che è più 
difficile cogliere con delle variabili uniche.	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1. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
During the last twenty years, some countries have seen a significant increase in cooperation 
between the public and private sectors for the development of infrastructures within several 
economic contexts (European Commission, 2003). This phenomenon is mainly due to the 
diffusion of some particular instruments, such as the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
arrangements. This first part of the work aims to introduce the concept of PPPs, in order to 
create a solid theoretical structure for the following two chapters. 
This concept is a fuzzy one, as it does not exist a unique definition. PPPs have been defined in 
several ways by different researchers, with each definition varying slightly from each other. 
However, PPPs share some common aspects. 
From a geographical point of view, PPPs were first developed in Anglo Saxon countries like 
Canada, Australia, South Africa and UK. However, nowadays they are increasingly used also 
in developing countries such as Brazil, India and China (see the paragraph 1.6 “PPPs in the 
developing countries”) because, as I will describe later, PPPs currently represent a strong and 
effective response to the low financial capacity that some countries or regions must face 
during different stages of their development. 
From a technical point of view, PPPs are an instrument supporting a deep collaboration 
between public and private sector. This strong collaboration constitutes the most relevant 
difference between PPPs and the more traditional forms of public procurement. The basic idea 
behind a PPP is that all the main phases, or large part of them, of the life of an infrastructure 
(designing, financing, building and after-construction management) are all in one hand: the 
private sector. Private investors have the burden to accomplish the project, and after the mere 
construction of the public good, they have to manage it for a long period (on average 20-30 
years). In general, the public good is created by the private agent without the presence of a 
direct public financing. Instead, there is the concession of use of infrastructure granted to a 
private part, which on the other hand brings its financial capacity and knowledge in the 
delivery of the project (building and managing). Furthermore “at the end of the concession 
period, the private party transfers the facility to the public sector” (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, 
p. 172). 
We can define PPPs by focusing on their three main specific aspects (Iossa and Martimort, 
2008): 
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I. Bundling, because PPP generally involves a set of phases (design, building, finance 
and management of the project) that are developed by a consortium of private firms or 
by a single firm. The degree of bundling depends on the size of the infrastructure and 
on the duration of the contract. The creation of a huge infrastructure would require the 
mobilization of a large amount of material and immaterial resources and skills, which 
are rarely owned by a single firm. Therefore, the larger the number of stages that are 
bundled together by the contract, the higher is the probability that PPPs are 
participated by a consortium of different firms, and not by a single firm. 
 
II. Risk transfer, as risk is typically transferred to the contractor. Government empowers 
the private party to get the control and the responsibility over the work. This particular 
aspect gives some degrees of freedom to the private party in the performance of 
operative tasks, which are necessary to achieve good results in terms of costs, quality 
and sustainability. With risk on their shoulders, private companies are pushed to 
maintain high standards. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, risk is shared between two parties, in particular when the 
infrastructure is really complex in terms of finance and fulfillment. 
 
III. Long-term contracting, as a PPP contract has an average duration of 20-35 years. The 
period includes both the construction period, and (especially) the management one. 
During this latter period, private party benefits of the return of the investment by 
managing the infrastructure, thanks to the payments made by simple public users of 
the facility, or in some particular cases by the government (especially in the case of 
PFI projects). 
Some of these specific aspects will be developed in the next chapters: risk management, 
legislation background, type of PPPs, performance of PPPs, are only few issues that make use 
of this kind of instrument complex, particularly in countries where there is not an efficient 
economic and juridical background. 
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1.2 Main differences between PPP and common procurement 
 
A starting issue is represented by the difference between the traditional forms of public 
procurement and PPPs, in terms of economic performances, technical advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The first difference is related to the nature of these two forms: through traditional 
procurement, governments can assign all the main phases of building, to several (different or 
in some cases identical) private companies. So for example to build an hydroelectric power 
central, the public sector can contract a sector-specialized firm to design and plan the 
structure, another specialized firm for the construction of the building, and also another one 
for the management and so on. There can be also a service or management contract with one 
further private company to deliver the facilities. All these private companies are paid with 
public funds and they are selected in order to guarantee the best quality and performance with 
respect to costs. 
This fragmentation does not occur in PPPs, because all the phases are sorted in only one 
contract that is actually the combination of separate contracts which are necessary in the 
traditional procurement. For this reason PPPs are addressed to one private entity, that, once 
selected, has to project, design, build and especially finance the creation of the public 
infrastructure.  
This shows that these two types of procurement (traditional and PPPs) can get to similar final 
results (the infrastructures), although adopting very different approaches: while in traditional 
procurement there could be a natural dispersion of finance and a weak sense of responsibility 
in managing public finance. Instead in the PPPs the private party can efficiently control the 
total works duration and reduce wastes in terms of finance and time since the financial effort 
generally is sustained by its own finance. 
The first prejudicial phenomenon is due to the risk of wrong valuation of the investment in 
terms of economic impact and to hazy lines of accountability, both linked to low competences 
in some public sector (Grimsey and Mervyn, 2004). The natural consequences of entrusting 
all these performances to private sector is the creation of higher standards of building quality 
and management, still considering costs and duration of the contract (MacDonald, 2002). 
Under PPPs there is a sort of initial safety in building the infrastructure. This is made possible 
by the following aspects: 
 
o Private party is fostered to chase an efficient design and a greater attention during the 
construction phase, in terms of materials and projects since it is not only a mere 
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builder, but it uses its private finance to create an infrastructure which will be 
managed by the same firm in the future; 
o During the design phase, contractor can follow the work and integrate the planning of 
the structure from a logistic point of view with respect to the future management; 
o In general there is a more precise valuation of the contract value before getting to 
construction phases; 
o From the point of view of the public sector, the possibility of transfer part of the risk 
to the private sector allows bidders to concentrate on creativity and quality standards 
in designing and building phases. 
 
It is important to underline that for acquiring all these preventive opportunities there should 
be high skilled specialists in the public sector, in order to guarantee a correct approach to the 
PPPs. Also for this reason it is required a great governments’ ability and it is clear that PPP 
could be a great opportunity only if it is managed with technical skills. 
On the other hand, in traditional procurement, government can easily steer all the operations 
because these are based on singular contracts, and because the public sector is the 
commissioner of the infrastructure, so it plays an important role in the design of the facilities. 
Besides all the main phases of the procurement are not strictly linked to specific standards of 
quality, so bidders could have lower interest in building a great infrastructure if they are not 
involved in a future management of it. So even if they can be controlled in a stricter way, the 
risk is that they may work by assuming low standard materials, weak project or overestimated 
costs since they may not have any future interest. 
In few words, PPPs are a type of procurement with a high level of risks, but they can bring to 
higher performances in phase of construction and design. By contrast, traditional procurement 
is easier to manage and allows public sector to have a “stronger voice” during the operational 
phases. However, procurement is a relatively narrow instrument that, especially in some 
sectors, leads to lower standards of quality than PPPs, because of the ability and specific skills 
of the private sector in building, designing and managing the infrastructure.  
The difference between traditional procurement and PPPs becomes more evident in the 
managing phase. Indeed, PPPs have a strong capacity to reduce cost in the long period, and on 
average they allow public sector to reach the two main goals of procurement: avoiding delays 
and cost overruns. 
Several studies were made to underline this evidence: 
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HM Treasury (2003) studied 61 PPP projects. The final result was that over 89 per cent of 
them were delivered on time or early, and all projects were within public sector budgets (see 
also Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
Stronger evidence comes from the UK National Audit Office (Nao, 2003; 2005) that 
compares the different performances of traditional procurement and PPPs. This study clearly 
demonstrated that conventional projects were on time only in 30 per cent of the cases, and 
even worst results come from a budget point of view, only 27 per cent of them was concluded 
within budget constraints. Instead, PPPs were delivered on time or early in 76 per cent of 
cases, and they respect the budgetary standards in 78 per cent of the cases.  
Actually, not always PPPs represent the best choice, or at least the cheapest one. In fact, 
evidence on PPP performance remains mixed (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). This contradiction 
is based on deep differences in the countries where PPPs are developed. This is principally 
because government plays a strong role in the final result, and in general the economic and 
juridical background can have a strong influence on the development of the procurement. 
Procurement’s performance is higher when the legal framework is effective. On the contrary, 
it is hampered by a muddled institutional system. PPP can also be positively integrated with 
part of public finance or simply blocked because of public finance insolvency. As mentioned 
before, the performance of PPPs is influenced by the quality of human capital working in the 
public sector, probably more than that of the private sector.  
If the country is not able to integrate, stimulate and then control this kind of procurements, the 
final results of PPPs will not be better than the traditional procurement compared to costs. 
In France, for example, PPPs tend to be more expensive than traditional procurement 
(Saussier, 2006). In Central and Eastern Europe, PPPs seem to be less successful than in the 
other parts of Europe (Brench et al., 2005).  
This evidence is not only linked to the institutional conditions of the country, but it appears 
also in some specific sectors and it is more evident also in case of conflict during the 
execution of the procurement: often instances for governments’ failure in respecting the terms 
of the contract, bring easily the project to a premature end (Guash, 2004). 
A detailed research in this sense was performed by Soomro and Zhang (2014), who studied a 
large number of PPP failures. The authors “demonstrated many problems and partnership 
failures, where both the public and private sectors suffered huge losses” (Soomro and Zhang, 
2014, p.1). The authors of the paper find several ways by which PPP may fail. The most 
common and important mechanisms are displayed in the following figure. 
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Figure 1 Some typical failure mechanisms in PPP development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These cases represent only few examples of how wrong evaluation made by private party 
involved in the project, can bring to cost overruns and delay or, in the worst case, to the 
premature end of the project. 
Another similar argument is widely discussed by the relevant literature: can PPP’s be 
considered as a form of privatization? 
The first evidence is that in the case of privatization, the private company assumes totally the 
service (and the use of the infrastructure) and there is no risk sharing: private firm is the first 
responsible of the correct delivery of the service. 
Moreover, private company that acquires a public company through a privatization process 
can be strongly influenced by industrial and pro-competition policies. In fact, the rules of 
service delivery can be modified by the government that can impose some particular 
regulatory regime over price or rate of return (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
Instead, PPPs are “formal business arrangements” between the public and the private sector, 
so every detailed aspects of the economic life of the arrangement (the nature of the business 
activity, the outcomes required, the prices paid for the services, and all the aspects related to 
the general rights and obligations) are specified and negotiated in the contract. Therefore, the 
Lack	  of	  Oinancing	  capacity	  	   Improper	  due	  diligence	  	   Unsuitable	  concessionaire	  selection	   Slow	  and	  hindered	  project	  progress	  	   Project	  nationalization	  	  
Lack	  of	  coordination	  with	  parallel	  projects	  	  
Slow	  and	  hindered	  project	  progress	  	   Concession	  cancelled	  	  
Poor	  quality	  of	  work	  	   Loss	  of	  customer	  trust	  	   Low	  trafOic	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   Less	  revenue	  generation	  	   Concessionaire	  insolvency	  	  
Source:	  Soomro	  and	  Zhang	  (2014)	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management of the PPP during all its life cycle is the direct result of the contract, and it is not 
linked to unstable forces. 
The contractual base of a PPP allows the private party to rely on a strong institutional 
structure during all stages of design, build and management of the public good. 
 
Table 1: Advantages and disavantages between contractual and institutional PPP 
 
Source: Panayides M., et al,  2014 
 
In conclusion, the peculiarity of PPP in the procurement scenario is quite evident, and great 
part of the difference is given by the country in which PPP is developed, and the specific 
economic and legal background that is involved in its development. 
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1.3 A short history of PPPs 
 
Collaboration between public and private sector has a very long history, which start can be 
pointed in 1663 with the first construction of turnpike in England (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
The idea of involving private forces for building large-scale infrastructures was determined by 
the absence of operative competences in the public sector. 
But it was only in the eighteenth century that PPPs were established from an institutional 
point of view, by giving to specific local bodies the duty of maintain and manage some roads. 
The input was immediately received by the private sector, and several Acts bring to the 
creation of as many “turnpike trusts”. In these early forms of PPPs it is possible to see already 
some crucial aspects of the modern agreement: the building and the project of the road was 
left to the ability of local units.  Also the well-defined time duration of the contract is another 
aspect that will be used in modern PPPs in the future, and finally the research of private funds 
from the users or from the contractors for building and maintaining the infrastructure. 
With this system, roads in England had an impressive development, and the following 
diffusion in the United States was only a natural consequence of this success.  
Another embryonic example of PPP, more recent, is represented by the construction of 
London Underground, for which a competitive selection of private companies was organized. 
Between 1894 and 1907 there was a national selection for the best bidder, which brought the 
English government to start the work for the underground in collaboration with several 
private companies (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). This trend did not stop with the conclusion of 
the works, but it continued with the widening and improvement of the service through years 
(Currie and Teague, 2015).  
This evidence proves the quality and the safety of PPP in England. Anyway, since 90’s no 
institutional legacy was made in order to institutionalize PPPs as an ordinary instrument for 
infrastructure construction. The first country in Europe that created a specific legislation for 
PPP was the United Kingdom, where Private Financing Initiative (PFI) was officially 
introduced in 1992. From this first PFI on, the number of PPPs has constantly increased, and 
before the recent financial crisis, the number of such initiatives amounted to 794, for a global 
capital value of £ 55 billion (CBI, 2007). From 1992 to 2006 PPPs arrangements have spread 
around Europe (Germany, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain especially), and at the 
same time, they reached the USA, where they are currently the most used contract for the 
construction of highway and road transportation, rail, and water supply and waste water 
treatment (CBO, 2007).  
PPPs have a strong diffusion also in the developing countries (see paragraph 1.6), where they 
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are basically used for the building of infrastructures in those contexts in which the public 
sector lacks both financial resources and technical competences. Chile and Mexico were 
pioneers in the use of PPPs (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). 
Following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis there has been an increasing interest in the 
adoption of PPP policy by governments in both developed and developing countries. This 
controversial tendency is largely due to the governments’ trust in the ability of PPP to raise 
additional finance in a context of budgetary constraints. This aspect is summed up by the 
possibility to make the best use of private sector’s technical knowledge in order to reduce 
costs, increase quality of the public good/service and speed up their development. 
In spite of the huge interest in PPPs by governments around the world, its implementation is 
still hampered by many obstacles. The latter include high transaction costs, long procurement 
processes, and lack of appropriate skills, unattractive financial market, incomplete risk 
transfer and higher end user charges. This strong country-variable is the cause of deep 
differences in the structure of PPPs all over the world. As told before, for PPPs to be 
successful, an effective legislative and control framework is required both to public and to 
private agents to recognize the objectives and needs of the other.  
The alternate use of PPP in Europe is well underlined by the following chart, which reports 
the value in EUR billion of PPP (H1 in the chart, dark blue bars) and the number of PPPs 
concluded year by year (H2 in the chart, light blue bars).   
 
 
Figure	  2:	  European	  PPP	  market	  2005-­‐2015	  by	  value	  and	  number	  of	  projects	  
Source:	  European	  Expertise	  Centre	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The “crisis effect” is well reported by the drop in terms of value and number of PPPs in the 
period 2009-2012. Instead the following slight growth tendency testifies the return to a 
growing economy in Europe, and in particular the strength of such procurement in situation of 
low financial means.  
For proving this slow growth in PPP realization in Europe, always from the EPEC (European 
PPP expertise center) it is possible to compare the number of large transactions (deals 
exceeding EUR 500 million), which in 2015 was only five, compared to 11 in 2014. Anyway 
their aggregate value amounted to EUR 9.6 billion, representing around 62% of the total 
market value. The five largest transactions reaching financial close in 2015 were: 
I. The third Istanbul airport (EUR 6 billion) in Turkey;  
II. The Etlik-Ankara health campus (EUR 1.1 billion) in Turkey;  
III. The Bilkent health campus (EUR 1.1 billion) in Turkey;  
IV. The Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer port (EUR 863 million) in France;  
V. The Ijmuiden sea-lock (EUR 508 million) in the Netherlands.  
This growing tendency of PPP in emerging European economies, is confirmed also in the 
following figure 3, which reports the distribution of huge infrastructure PPP in Europe, by 
number of deals and by total value in EUR million. UK is the first in number of deals, and 
this observation confirms the historical tradition of PPP in the United Kingdom. Long 
experience and consolidate institutions are the guarantee for a constant use of partnerships.  
Anyway, this large use of PPPs in the country is not balanced by a large amount of financial 
flows. Turkey has the record in this sense. In fact with few but impressive projects, Turkey 
has the best financial use for PPPs. 
This aspect remarks the differences that each economic backgrounds can bring to PPP 
diffusion or restriction, evidence that is even stressed in Europe, where countries have deep 
differences each other. 
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Figure 3: The distribution of PPPs and their total value by country in Europe in 2015. 
 
In conclusion, PPPs are experiencing an ongoing transformation. In some cases, their 
application has required a substantial reform of legal and financial systems. Specific actions 
are needed to define the role of the public sector, to build an institutional capacity at all levels, 
to include the allocation of qualified and motivated staff to specialized PPP units, the 
reduction of market risks through user-oriented strategic approaches and the development of 
private sector investment facilitation mechanisms.  
  
Source:	  European	  Expertise	  Centre	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1.4 Technical contents in a typical PPP and some possible PPP structures 
 
In order to talk about the technical contents of PPPs, we need first to describe the birth of a 
generic PPP, i.e. what is its starting point and which are the parties involved in the first part of 
the project. 
PPPs often start from the initiative of the public agents, and more precisely, from a specific 
need of the public sector about the creation of infrastructures, or services, that – either for 
financial or for technical causes - has to be structured with the help of private agents. These 
needs normally emerge in some specific fields, which are summarized in the following Table 
2. 
 
Table 2: Sector and specific object of PPP 
Sector Specific use of PPP 
Transport Roads, bridges, highways, railways, metro 
lines, airports. This field is historically the most 
common and used for PPP. 
Technology and telecommunications Government funding for private R&D, 
innovation centres, laboratories, transmitting 
devices, internet network. There is a strong link 
between PPP and innovation. 
Water Wastewater treatment systems in particular, but 
also sewers and drain systems. 
Prisons Not only the mere construction of the facilities, 
but also the maintenance and the logistic aid of 
the structure after the conclusion of the works 
Health and welfare Hospitals, schools and university are only the 
first three fields that are involved in this case. 
Hundreds of sub-structures in this sector are 
involved in PPP agreements.  
Energy solutions Power plants of different types: solar, 
hydroelectric, thermal and so on. 
But also R&D in this field is deeply fostered by 
PPPs 
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Urban regeneration Re-planning old part of a town, create some 
new structures from the old ones, use the space 
for new design and projects 
Source:  Grimsey and Lewis, 2004 
This distribution has obviously different weights between each sectors. As it is possible to see 
from the following chart, taking the European scenario as example, transport remains by far 
the largest for total money value. With more than EUR 9 billion worth of transactions, 
transport represents around 60% of the total market value in 2015. However, the number of 
deals closed in the sector decreased significantly (12 compared to 23 in 2014). Instead 
education involves the largest part of number of PPP signed in 2015. 
Figure 4: Sector breakdown by value and number of transactions on 2015 
 
Source: European Expertise Centre 
It is important to underline that PPPs are not always related to the creation of a new 
infrastructure, but they can be created also for the implementation of a previous structure or 
facilities. 
After the identification of the need, the public sector is only at the first stage of a very 
complex process in which it will be always involved with different degree of action and 
different aims. 
Immediately after the identification of the need, there must be a valuation of the impact of the 
project in terms of financial weight and of operational risks. The valuation should consider all 
the possible alternatives to PPPs and, all the possible technical forms that a PPP can assume.  
Correlated to this stage there is a more specific economic-oriented stage, an ex-ante 
evaluation of all the economic returns of the investment, the possible cost-structures, and a 
funding research has to be created. At this point, all the features of a PPP regarding public, 
private or shared financing are discussed and valuated. 
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In the first stage, public sector moves with network planner and internal audit, but in 
subsequent stages, a new actor appears in the process: a project manager, which is needed to 
structure the project that will be presented in bid stages. The role of the public manager is 
fundamental, because the result of his work will be  “the request” from public sector to 
private party. This last one will embrace or not the project, and its choice is based in large part 
on the project plan exposed by public sector. More precise and detailed the project is, more it 
will approachable by the private sector. 
The next step is the bid, which can assume various forms: it can be public, strictly directed to 
some selected parties, international or national, based on costs or performances criteria. All 
these aspects have to be fixed before launching the bid, because after this operation the public 
sector can only evaluate the bidders and their proposals. 
After the choice of the winning bidder and the agreement, public and private parties start the 
real partnership, and the project is finalized according to both parts’ requirements. In this 
stage, all the main policy issues and the general features of the infrastructure and the future 
management are specified and integrated by both parties. The final negotiation brings the 
project to its realization, and the PPP enters its operative stage. The construction stage can last 
for years, with different and various implications on both parties. 
The post-construction management can be defined either ex-ante, by the first contract, or in a 
later moment, with another specific arrangement. Examples of the first category are the BOO, 
BOT or BOOT types of PPPs that include, by definition, the operational stage. Therefore, 
private companies signing these types of contracts will be the same in both construction and 
managing stages. 
In the post-construction management stage, responsibility in the service delivery, costs and 
quality of the performances are the main themes discussed in the phase of contract for the 
concession. 
In conclusion, public sector is the “first mover” in the creation of a PPP, but it has to follow 
all the stages of a PPP by maintaining a strong relationship with the private party. The 
following table summarize all the main actions that may occur during the main stages of a 
PPP realization. It is focused on public sector side, where a series of specialised figure work 
for the fine realization of the project during its advancement. 
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Table 3: Main stages of a PPP from the public sector point of view. 
Stage Main Tasks Government role 
Define service need Identify service needs Customer, network planner 
Determine outputs 
Consider network effects 
Allow scope for innovation 
Appraisal Examine various alternatives Network planner, protector 
of environment, 
representative of public 
interest 
Evaluate financial consequences, 
risks and other impacts 
Business case Quantify risks and costs, establish 
net profit 
Network planner, founding 
Cost-benefit analysis 
Obtain founding and project 
approval 
Project development Assemble project resources Project manager 
Create a project plan 
Bidding process Develop an issue expression of 
interest invitation 
Concession grantor 
Evaluate responses and prepare 
shortlist 
Issue Project Brief 
Evaluate bids 
Project finalization 
review 
Confirm value for money and 
achievement of policy intent 
Network planner, 
representative of public 
interest 
Final negotiation Establish negotiation framework 
and team 
Concession grantor, 
funding 
Probity review 
Execute contract 
Financial close 
Contract management Handover to contract 
management responsibilities 
Inspector, overseer, contract 
manager 
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Formalize management 
responsibilities 
Finalize project delivery 
Handle variations to contract 
Monitor the service outputs 
Maintain the integrity of the 
contract 
Source: Grimsey and Lewis, 2004  
 
After this presentation of the process, it is important to introduce some of the possible 
structures of a PPP, because the choice of the most suitable type of PPP can deeply influence 
the final performance of the infrastructure. PPPs can assume many different forms, which can 
vary from country to country. However, most of them can be summarized in the following 
list, (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004): 
o Public provision of collective goods 
o Service provision contracts 
o Outsourcing/contracting 
o Design and construct (D & C) 
o Sale and leaseback 
o Operate and maintain (O & M) 
o Operate maintain and manage (OM & M) 
o Build operate transfer (BOT), this is a frequently used type of PPP, in which the 
private sector maintains a strong responsibility. Financing, designing, building and 
coordinating the project are all duties of the private sector. Only control and formal 
ownership of the infrastructure is in the hand of the public sector. 
o Build lease transfer (BLT) 
o Build lease transfer maintain (BLTM) 
o Build own operate remove (BOOR). This arrangement is particularly suited for a 
temporary infrastructure or service. It is generally driven by a SPV (Special purpose 
vehicle), a company that is specifically created for the realization of the project; 
o Build own operate transfer (BOOT) 
o Lease renovate operate transfer (LROT) 
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o Design build finance operate (DBFO). This is a  ‘complete’ type of PPP, in which the 
private party is responsible for all the stages of the process, from the first steps 
(design) to the conclusion and administration; 
o Design construct manage finance (DCMF) 
o Design build finance operate manage (DBFOM). As suggested by the acronym, this 
type of PPP covers all the relevant stages of the process, from the first design phases 
to the management of the public good. A transfer phase (to the public agent) is not 
present; 
o Build own operate (BOO). With this kind of PPP, the control and the ownership of 
the infrastructure remain in the hand of the private party, which must finance, design, 
build and manage the facilities; 
o Franchise  
o Concession 
o Joint venture (JV). This is the most common example of PPP, in which private and 
public parties share the risks, and take joint decisions over every operations; 
o Regeneration partnership 
o Outright privatization  
 
This list is not exhaustive, but includes all the most common types of PPPs. In particular, 
arrangements like BOO, BOOT, BOT and DBFO represent nowadays the most common type 
of arrangements. 
Indeed, these latter can vary from country to country, depending on the different institutional 
frameworks. As it will be shown in the empirical analysis, this instrument is strictly linked to 
the background in which it is developed.  
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1.5 Risk management and governance of partnerships 
 
As it happens in the case of public procurement, all stages of PPPs are characterized by the 
presence of risks. However, these latter are here divided between the public and the private 
agents. This raises different concerns in the two parties. 
The main issue concerns public agent who has to monitor the activity of the private agent and 
the definition of the value for money that was predetermined by achieving public funds. This 
last term is interpreted rarely in the sense of direct public incentives, which are infrequent in 
PPP as we saw before. Instead in PPP, the term “public funds” has to be meant as the 
concession of the infrastructure to private party, and the economic revenue cashed in the 
management of the project by private sector.  
Actually the “need for infrastructure” arises from a social necessity and the born of the project 
has to respond to a general social utility in terms of economy sustainability and social result. 
For this reason public sector has the necessity to guarantee an effective use of public finance 
in the realization of a PPP and that its realization goes to a fine solution. As it will discussed 
in the following chapter, PPP can bring typically three kind of results:  
1. Economic sustainability; 
2. Social sustainability; 
3. Innovation and environmental effect. 
 These goals can be achieved only “by integration of an asset design, construction techniques 
and operational practises, and by the transfer of key risks in design, construction delays, cost 
overruns, and finance and insurance to private sector” (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, p. 171). 
Private party obviously is the second fundamental party of the procurement. It has similar 
worries about adequate address of its finance to the project,  
Actually, the risk of a “wrong address of finance” is not the only worry on private party’s 
shoulder because private company generally has the burden to complete the realization of the 
infrastructure and then manage it. So a large scale of operative and technical risks is within 
the private party. By using the theoretical base of the work of Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p. 
172), a list of nine categories of risk that every project may face, could be developed as 
following: 
1. Technical risk, due to mere engineering mistakes and design underestimations. These 
mistakes can easily bring the project to delays and cost overruns; 
2.  Construction risk, which is usually linked to the previous type of risk. It can 
compromise the life of the project and, unfortunately, that of the workers, due to weak 
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work safety practices and low quality materials. Delay, cost overruns and 
disappointing performance are the possible consequences; 
3. Operating risk. This category includes the risks that relate to operating and 
maintenance of the infrastructure; 
4. Revenue risk, due to future managing failures in delivering the services at right prices 
and with appropriate quality standards. This can bring result in revenue deficiencies; 
5. Financial risk, due to inadequate hedging of revenues streams and financing costs. 
Level of interest rates and inflation are the critical factors; 
6. Natural cataclysm, which can compromise or even interrupt the construction of the 
infrastructure or its management; 
7. Regulatory or political risks, which relate to changes in policies or institutional 
structures. Especially in countries or regions in which there is not a strong and 
consolidate presence of the public hand, this can lead to changes in the contract; 
8. Environmental risks, occurring in sectors such as energy and water treatment in 
particular, due to adverse environmental impacts and hazards; 
9. Project default, as a consequence of any of the above. 
 
Bearing in mind these risks, the parties involved in the project try to find the best distribution 
of responsibilities. This negotiation mechanism is a fundamental stage in every kind of PPP, 
and it has to be run by experts in order to find the best risk-sharing structure for the parties 
involved. 
Such negotiation is based on three specific issues (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004): 
 
I. The detailed description of service obligations 
A central feature of PPPs is that the public sector plays a relatively passive role in receiving 
services, as it does not procure any asset. This happens in the most common cases of PPP, in 
which the private party is responsible for the management of the infrastructure and the 
delivery of the services. This implies that all the legal aspects related to the future 
management have to be evaluated by both parties during the negotiation stage. In particular, 
government has to include its desired level of risk transfer. The level of accuracy of this 
contract will deeply influence the service delivery by the private company, and, furthermore, 
the managing of the structure during the operative phases and the future transfer of the utility 
to the public party. As Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p. 177) state:  “Government’s only concerns 
are, first, to satisfied that the engineering solution is sufficiently robust [..] and second, if the 
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asset is to return to government with a useful life beyond the contract term, that it is suitably 
maintained during the contract term.”. 
In conclusion, if government fails in defining a well-structured service delivery regulation, it 
may involuntary take the risk of acquiring a badly managed infrastructure, or, even worse, a 
bad long-term contract for the delivery of the service. Both cases are examples of the risks 
that must be faced by the private party as the only deliver of the service and head of 
infrastructure management  
 
II. The pricing structure 
The creation of an appropriate payment mechanism is fundamental for allocating the risk 
during the finalization of the project, and encouraging the private sector to maintain high-
level performances in service delivery (Grimsey and Mervyn, 2004). 
Without a precise pricing structure, private party may not be incentivized to adopt the 
behavior expected by the public party. According to this principle, payments could follow a 
“service-based” mechanism, for which payments are based on specific features of the service 
(in general: availability and simple performance), which are evaluated by some specialized 
government institutions. This system is typically used in accommodation services, “where 
usage may be variable but availability is a pre-requisite” (Grimsey and Mervyn, 2004). 
Another typical payment mechanism could be the transaction- or usage –based one, which is 
based on the level of usage of the infrastructure by users. The use of this variable can allow 
taking into accounts also the quality of the service.  
The last mechanism is based on benefits, in which specific organizational structure and 
management group evaluate the improvement made by the private party. In this case 
payments are linked to words like “more efficiency and safety” or “new business model”. 
In all these three different systems, it is clear that private parties are involved in the project in 
relation to the quality of its presence in the relationship, and a perfect incentive to achieve 
good performance in the procurement is to establish a precise payment mechanism. 
 
III. Specific contractual provisions which can have an implicit risk allocation structure  
The basis presented in previous points represent a rigid view of risk allocation management, 
in practice, risk allocation in a PPP is more flexible and at the same time is more complex: 
broadly the goal is to entrust risk to the party which will be the best manager of it. Actually 
risk management depends on the type and the object of the project (which infrastructure is 
involved in the project? Which are its dimensions in terms of economic investment and 
engineering size?), it depends on the type of PPP (for example if the selected PPP includes or 
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not the “operate” term in its natural contract) and finally of course it depends on the 
characteristics of the parties involved in the project (their financial structure, their experience 
in procurement like PPP, their ability in managing this kind of project, and so on).  
This partition generally follows a “risk matrix” where the basis could be the previous 
presentation of the nine categories of risks, specified in relationship to the specific features of 
the project, and for each voices presented in the matrix, parties define a precise responsibility, 
which can normally assumed four kind of responses: public sector, private sector, shared, 
external (insurers, external investments and sponsors). 
A general step-process scheme could be as following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming this general scheme is fundamental in risk management and the fine realization of 
the whole project is clearly linked to this part of the work. 
The final result of this process can be summarized by the following table, which describe a 
possible best-ratio distribution of all the types of risks involved in a PPP:  
 
Figure 5: Risk sharing scheme 
 
Source: Chung D. et al., 2009 
Even if it is clear that this specific distribution can deeply differ from case to case, it testifies 
the large size of possible risks, and consequently the importance to define a proper allocation 
between the two parties.  
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28	  	  
Risks linked to the government of the country in which PPP takes place should be on the 
shoulder of the public party (political and sovereign risks), as well as the risk of giving no 
clearly defined rules to the project in all its phases, from the bid to the post-construction 
management. 
Instead private party generally assumes risks associated directly to the mere execution of the 
PPP, in this case financial and governance risks are two illustrative examples of risks on the 
hand of private company. 
In the middle of the distribution it is possible to assign a shared risks area, in which compares 
a mixed effect class of risks, from natural cataclysm to media risk, there are all the risks not 
directly linked to the responsibility of the parties. So in this case it is natural to think about a 
shared risk class in which responsibilities are divided between public and private parties. 
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1.6 PPPs in the developing countries 
 
Form the latest research developed by PPP Knowledge Lab in 2015, it is possible to 
understand the impact of this kind of instrument in the developing countries, where the lack of 
specific capability in the public sector, may be balanced by a strong use of PPP, which 
involves also international companies and responds to the enormous infrastructure needs  
(Grimsey, and Mervyn , 2004). 
This is the cause of the success of PPP in China for example, where the economic expansion 
fosters this kind of agreements, and specialized companies all over the world are requested for 
the construction and the design of huge infrastructures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PPP Knowledge Lab 
 
Only in Russia the diffusion struggles to have a great success, that is probably due to the 
impressive rules for international trading and the heavy of institutional system in the 
economic development (Russia is 170/189 in “Doing Business” chart for the voice of “trading 
across borders” and 119/189 at the voice “Dealing with construction permits”, where 1 is the 
best position worldwide, according to the studies in the site www.doingbusiness.org). 
China	   India	   Russia	   Brazil	   Mexico	   Argentina	  PPP	  Projects	   1124	   787	   59	   727	   226	   169	  Active	  PPP	  Projects	   1083	   746	   55	   694	   195	   108	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Table 4: the distribution of PPP's and PPP's potential projects in developing countries in 2015 
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The Russian case represents the best example of what is called “institutional risks” (Miller 
and Lessard, 2001). In fact even if in PPP there is a strong responsibility assumed by the 
private sector, as explained largely in the previous chapters, this incentive is not the only 
responsible in the fine realization of a PPP. Law and regulations imposed by governments can 
support the project or actually stress its difficulties. Property right, industrial policies, 
sovereign risks, warranties in loan are only some elements that are involved in this specific 
issue. 
Another secondary aspect is related to the “absence of what might be called a PPP culture in 
emerging markets” (Grimsey and Mervyn, 2004, p.220). Poor experience in managing this 
instrument and natural lack in legal framework are included in this factor, which in several 
cases is added to a socialist legacy (of course this can be more or less evident in the countries 
taken for example) which can overestimate the impact of PPP in the economy or even block 
the diffusion of the instrument in the country. 
In contrast with this negative aptitude there are some evident commercial benefits in adopting 
PPP in emerging markets, part of them are naturally some classic PPP’s benefits, but others 
are are also specific benefits arising from PPP in developing countries (Grimsey and Mervyn, 
2004). These advantages can be summarized in the following list: 
1. Ensuring that the PPP facilitates technology transfer from the foreign investors to the 
local public sector; 
2. The possibility to select projects that promote competition and market-based 
mechanisms, skills and innovation in sectors underdeveloped in relationship with the 
worldwide average; 
3. Massive share between private and public sector in learning experience; 
4. Global reform of public sector as a result of gaining new commercial skills, freeing 
ideas from capital constraints, and working with the latest technological know-how. 
 
Another issue affecting the diffusion of PPP in emerging markets is the environment impact 
of this kind of instrument in the management of energy solutions. Crucial activities like 
conserving water and other resources, minimizing waste, enhancing biodiversity and 
controlling pollution, are all fundamental (Grimsey and Mervyn, 2004).  All these arguments 
are clearly important worldwide, but they assume a stronger meaning in countries where 
usually there is not an effective policy in order to guarantee a global conformity to the recent 
dispositions in terms of environment. 
A specific attention in designing the infrastructure, the respect of global rules in the use of 
sustainable materials in phase of construction and finally the collaboration between local 
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companies and foreign companies, more specialized in this kind of infrastructure, can help the 
diffusion of an environmental sustainability also in the developing countries. 
In conclusion of this first chapter we have seen the dualistic aim of PPP: on one side the 
importance of fostering the partnership between public and private sector, in order to 
guarantee the exchange of financial, technical and management capabilities. On the other side 
the difficulties in developing this kind of agreement, which can emerge in some particular 
economic and social context, and the crucial issue of risk management. 
All these aspects combined, make the following analysis even more interesting. We will see 
how, certain factors can influence positively and negatively the final result of the PPP. Result 
divided in four macro-categories, which cover all the aspects discussed before: economic 
sustainability, social need, environmental sustainability and innovation. 
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2. Empirical Study 
 
2.1 Introduction to Meta-Analysis and meta-regression analysis 
 
The final objective of this work is to create an overview of the phenomenon of PPP through 
an extended selection of specialized papers. Literature on this subject is very ample and each 
work gives somehow a different point of view of the matter.  
Empirical evidences, as emerged from the scientific papers, are quite case-specific and in 
some cases also contradictory. This difference is more evident when authors analyse the result 
of each PPP, because the analysis is often mixed with analytic methods (budgetary or 
economic standards) and personal impressions. If we add the complexity given by the 
economic and social background where each PPP is developed, we assume a large amount of 
variability to the characteristics that can influence the final result of the partnership. 
The goal of the analysis is exactly to create a statistical structure that should be able to 
establish some correct relationships between these variables and the final result of the 
partnership and in other words, to understand which variables can easier influence a positive 
final result, and which a negative one.  
As mentioned before, variables have been taken from different scientific works and papers, in 
which the authors choose different methods and point of views to analyse the phenomenon. 
For these reasons, from the first steps, it was clear that for establishing a relationship between 
the variables, the best statistical instrument for achieving the goal of the entire work, was the 
meta-analysis. In particular, we use the most used form of investigation in economic 
empirical research: Meta–regression analysis (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989; Jarrell and Stanley, 
1990). 
We need to introduce this particular quantitative method in order to understand the results that 
will be presented in the in the following chapter.  
As in every statistical model, also in meta-regression analysis there are two main groups of 
variables:  
o Dependent variable, which is a regression parameter that results from each study 
included in the analysis; 
o Independent variable, which “may include characteristics of the method, design and 
data used” (Stanley, 2001, p.132). 
33	  	  
 
Therfore, meta-regression analysis can be a perfect instrument for combining different results 
and giving a general view and explanation of the phenomenon. 
As explained by Stanley (2001) meta-analysis has five main phases and each of them helps to 
understand the whole process behind this statistical instrument: 
 
I. “Include all Relevant Studies from a Standard Database”. 
The importance of including all the studies regarding the same subject can help the analyst 
to reduce the possibility to introduce potential bias. The research has to be careful and 
analytic, with the inclusion of all the information of each single paper used for the analysis. 
For this phase is advised to include all studies, also when there is a doubt about the content 
or the method used in (Stanley, 2001). 
 
II. “Choose a Summary Statistic and Reduce The Evidence to a Common Metric”. 
The natural following step of the creation of the database is the identification of some 
common characteristics of the studies and the process of coding them. This phase can be 
very long and costly in terms of time (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990) but it is necessary to 
create the statistical structure. 
In this phase two distinctions are introduced: summary measures and effect-size. The first 
one is used for a preliminary summarization of the set of observations, with the aim of 
communicate the largest amount of information as emerged from the studies. The effect 
side instead is the result of the necessity of transforming “the summary statistics to a 
common and comparable metric” (Stanley, 2001, p. 135). This process of integration 
between different findings, passes through a statistical method which can be understood as 
explained by Stanley when defines effect size as “the average outcome of the treatment 
group minus the average outcome of the control group, divided by the standard deviation 
of the control group” (Stanley, 2001, p. 135). 
This statistic, once it had been transformed in a common metric, will be used as the 
dependent variable. 
III. “Choose Moderator Variables”. 
Every possible variable that can be useful for describing the subject of the analysis is 
called “moderator variable” and for this reason the group of “moderator variables” 
represents the set of independent variables.  
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They should be generally consequential and presented as dummy variables in order to 
permit an easier study-to-study analysis (Stanley, 2001).  
 
IV. “Conduct a Meta-regression Analysis” 
Once the two groups of variables were structured and well defined, data set is ready to pass 
through the real meta-regression analysis. This process allows the analyst to arrive to an 
explanation of one study-to-study variation as raised from empirical literature previously 
analysed (Stanley, 2001). In other words the process allows the researcher to define the 
impact of the independent variables on the dependent variables, and actually if there is or 
neither correlation between them. 
This part of the work is the cornerstone of the entire process and the results deriving from 
meta-regression analysis can also find new interesting patterns and relations that can 
deeply help to understand the phenomenon. And if this result of a certain variable is 
particularly important and solid, the same variable should be included in future studies. 
 
V.  “Subject the Meta-regression Analysis to Specification Testing” 
Meta-regression analysis does not avoid the risk of revealing errors or failures in the 
results. The risk can be resolved thanks to specific statistical tests (Stanley, 2001). 
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2.2 Methodology 
 
We will apply the meta-regression analysis technique to a particular case. Indeed, the 
literature on PPP is descriptive and based on case studies. This literature tries to establish 
logical cause-effect links between the characteristics of the observed PPPs and their results, 
which are presented and discussed in qualitative terms. We therefore do have any parameter 
to be entered in a meta-analysis, as usually happens with meta-analyses, but we only have 
descriptions. Thus, the first step was to extract from the cases analyzed in the literature some 
relevant information that could be used to build the variables (mainly expressed in the form of 
presence/absence) that could enter into a regression analysis. 
Our meta-regression analysis tries to understand whether some types of results (social, 
economic, in terms of innovation) that the PPPs can achieve are significantly correlated with 
some of the PPP characteristics. The variables were chosen based on the availability of 
information in all cases presented in the literature, as well as on the basis of the importance 
assigned to them in the various literature review that we have consulted. 
By referring to the main steps identified by Stanley (2001) and described in the previous 
section, we comment below what have been our main steps. 
 
1. “Include all Relevant Studies from a Standard Database”. 
Our starting point has been a search on the Scopus database, through which we have collected 
all articles published in academic journals from 1985 to 2015 that have PPP* (or public-
private partnership*) in their keywords, abstract or title.1 After having cleaned our database, 
excluding those cases in which the term public-private partnership is anything but a generic 
form of (desired or actual) collaboration between public and private actors, we got 1764 
articles, published in 643 journals.  
In order to describe the content of the literature on PPPs and procurement, we have focused 
on keywords that authors have used to describe their work. By reading the articles’ keywords, 
we have identified the articles that referred to PPPs in the public works sector and those that 
reported evidence about specific case studies. We thus selected 22 articles. By carefully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The search was performed in January 2016. We searched for regular journal articles or 
reviews that are written in English, and which belong to the subject areas ‘social sciences’, 
‘business’ or ‘economics’. Note that the subject area ‘social sciences’ includes environmental 
and planning studies, decision sciences and others). In addition, we considered different 
spellings for public-private partnerships (e.g.: singular or plural, with or without a hyphen, 
short-term or extended term). We have chosen the database Scopus because its relevance has 
increased in the last years, and because it covers a wide variety of quality journals. It is 
available at: https://www.scopus.com/.   
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reading such articles, we further selected those papers that presented a full description of the 
case study, including all the relevant information. To identify the most relevant features of 
PPP, we referred to the study of Graeme A. Hodge at al., (2010) and the work by Carbonara  
(2013). 
 
2. “Choose a Summary Statistic and Reduce The Evidence to a Common Metric”.  
PPP can be judged at the conclusion of the partnership or during its development. In both 
cases what raises from the papers, is that not all the PPP’s bring to equal results. Actually not 
all the cases can be assumed as a positive impact on social-economic context. 
For these reasons in this part of the work, the effort has taken two distinctive directions: the 
choice of four main types of positive results, and the distinction between success and failure 
in each case. 
For the first objective, four big results have been selected (economic and social sustainability, 
innovation and environmental sustainability). Economic and social sustainability have been 
selected because they represent the foundation of every PPP. In fact the creation of an 
infrastructure and its use, have to respond to a public need and to specific budgetary 
standards. Moreover they are undoubtedly the most studied and analysed in the papers used 
for this specific data set.  
The last two result-variables instead have been selected for the increasing tendency to 
evaluate these projects also for their impact on environmental background and on innovation. 
All these variables have been selected and organized with dummy variables, which include 
three kinds of results: positive =1; negative =-1; neutral (or no evidence in the text) = 0.  
 
3.  “Choose Moderator Variables”. 
The choice of this kind of variables represents the heart of the analysis, because the impact of 
them in the PPP can deeply influence the success or neither of the projects. They incorporate 
all the main characteristics of a PPP, from financial structure to the management, so the 
choice of them responds to the specific aim of observing the impact of these variables in the 
entire project. 
As for the previous category, they have been arranged with dummy variables and they take 
the value of 1 if the specific characteristic has been observed, and the value of 0 if there is no 
evidence of its manifestation or if the author does not take it into account for the analysis. 
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4. “Conduct a Meta-regression Analysis”. 
With the aim of concluding the statistical analysis, we choose to elaborate data set with a 
Logit-regression model. This regression model is frequently used with categorical dependent 
variables. So in this particular case, with the total presence of dummy variables, it 
immediately seems perfect for this specific goal.  
What rises from the analysis will be exposed in the next chapter, in this section it is sufficient 
to know that some variables have been simplified in order to obtain an easier interpretation of 
some kind of results. It is the case, for example, of variables including bundling level which 
have been grouped in two main variables: high bundling (including PPP integrated from 
design to manage) and low bundling.  
In general this approach gave us good results, and for most of the variables is now possible to 
understand and calculate their weight on the success of PPP.  
 
5. “Subject the Meta-regression Analysis to Specification Testing” 
In order to examine the analysis it was necessary to apply to the regression some tests, which 
should prove the significance of the results. We choose to use a z-test and Log likelihood. The 
first one is simply the ratio between the coefficient and its standard error, and it represents the 
approximation by a normal distribution of the original distribution, under the null hypothesis. 
Log likelihood measures the inference of each parameters, and if it is combined with z, can 
give us a general degree of significance of the regression model to the observations. 
 
The list of the variables is presented in the following table (table 5), in which each variable is 
descripted and associated to its significance in dummy variable. Average and Standard 
Deviation for each variable are reported next to the description. 
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Table 5: variables tables 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
R
es
ul
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
  
Social sustainability  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if evident result in 
terms of social utility appears from the research. It takes 
the value of 0 if no evidence appears from the work, and 
finally it can assume the value of -1 if the result is 
negative or damaging 
0,7 0,64 
Economic sustainability 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the project 
respects its financial and economics previsions. It takes 
the value of 0 if no evidence appears from the work, and 
finally it can assume the value of -1 if the PPP meet cost 
overruns or financial failures 
0,53 0,67 
Environmental sustainability 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the PPP respect 
specific environmental standards. It takes the value of 0 
if no evidence appears from the work, and finally it can 
assume the value of -1 if the result is negative or 
damaging for the environment 
0,19 0,45 
39	  	  
Innovation  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if some 
procedural or material innovation takes place from the 
developing of the project. It takes the value of 0 if no 
evidence appears from the work, and finally it can 
assume the value of -1 if the entire project is even 
timeworn in respect to contemporary standards  
0,26 0,49 
C
on
tro
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Country Variables 
UK 
Set of dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the 
empirical case presented in the paper refer that specific 
country (or geographical area) 
0,16 0,37 
Spain 0,07 0,26 
Netherlands 0,16 0,37 
Other in Europe 0,14 0,35 
U.S.A 0,07 0,26 
Canada 0,02 0,15 
Australia  0,3 0,46 
Other around the 
world 
0,07 0,26 
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Sector Variables 
Energy solution 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
related to one of the following sectors 
0,09 0,29 
Transport 0,42 0,5 
Social 
commodities 
0,49 0,51 
Article Variables 
Years of 
publication 
The year an article is published 2009,56 3,67 
Economics 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the article is 
published in a journal in the area of Economics (ISI 
Web of Science classification) 
0,3 0,46 
Management 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the article is 
published in a journal in the area of Management (ISI 
Web of Science classification) 
0,3 0,46 
Planning and 
public 
administration 
studies 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the article is 
published in a journal in the area of Urban planning or 
public administration paper (ISI Web of Science 
classification) 
0,4 0,49 
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at
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Contract Type 
 Contractual PPP 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the legal 
ground of the PPP lies in one or more contracts signed 
by the parties 
0,77 0,43 
 Institutional PPP 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the legal 
ground of the PPP is not constituted by one or more 
contracts signed by the parties.  
0,23 0,43 
Years of PPP 
80s 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the PPP has 
been implemented (and completed) in that decade 
0,02 0,15 
 '90s 0,37 0,49 
2000s 0,6 0,49 
Time Horizon 
Medium term (less 
than 25 years)  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the concession 
duration lasts less than 25 years.  
0,37 0,49 
Long term (more 
than 25 years)  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the concession 
duration lasts more than 25 years.  
0,63 0,49 
SPV ownership 
NO SPV  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the PPP is not 
implemented through the creation of a SPV (special 
purpose vehicle) 
0,49 0,51 
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Totally Private 
company 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the SPV is 
present and if it is composed entirely by one or more 
private companies. If there is not SPV or if it is not 
composed by private companies, it takes the value of 0 
 
0,26 
 
0,44 
Sub-Private SPV  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the SPV is 
present and if it is composed in part by private 
companies and in part by public sector. If there is not 
SPV or if it is not composed in this way, it takes the 
value of 0 
0,23 0,43 
Number of partners  
Two parties 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if in the 
relationship between public and private, there are only 
two main parties.  
0,58 0,5 
More than two 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if in the 
relationship between public and private, there are more 
than two main parties.  
0,42 0,5 
Risk allocation 
Shared between 
public and private 
sectors  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the risks is 
shared between the parties.  
0,67 0,47 
Private sector  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if risks are only 
on the private party responsibility.  
0,16 0,37 
Forms of financing Fully private  Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the whole 0,49 0,51 
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financing derives from private capacity.  
Partly private  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the private 
financing is integrated by some forms of public 
incentives or direct financing.  
0,44 0,5 
Bundling level 
DBOT 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,16 0,37 
BOT 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,12 0,32 
DBMFO 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,21 0,41 
Service provision 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,02 0,15 
BFOMT 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,05 0,21 
BOO 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,02 0,15 
DBFO 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,28 0,45 
BOOT 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,09 0,29 
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DBFM 
Dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the PPP is 
developed on the basis of the specific bundling level  
0,05 0,21 
Governance 
Private governance 
with public 
supervision 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the governance 
of the infrastructure is fully private, although with a 
public external supervision.  
0,4 0,49 
Mixed public-
private governance 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the governance 
of the infrastructure is given by a mixed public-private 
management 
0,4 0,49 
Bid Shape 
Public and best 
offer choice 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bid is made 
by public demand  
0,58 0,5 
Limited to a 
specific numbers 
of participants 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bid process 
is made by inviting a limited number of participants.  
0,19 0,39 
Aimed to one 
private company 
 Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bid is 
addressed to only one specific private company or 
consortium.  
0,07 0,26 
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2.3 Variables explanation 	  
In order to establish a correct relationship between each variable that we will use in the meta-
analysis, it is important to understand fully the meaning of them and this part of the chapter 
has this goal. 
First of all we have to underline that the work and the method are partially inspired by a 
previous paper made by Carbonara (2013) in which the author presented a general scheme of 
classification of PPP with a cross-country and cross-sector analysis. With this work as a solid 
theoretical base, the analysis here is developed by taking into account 22 specialized papers. 
The table where data set has been structured is well suited for the aim of the work. In fact 
variables have been selected as the most important components in the developing of a PPP. 
They can be summarized and developed in five groups: 
 
I. ID AND TITLE OF THE PAPER, for a mere classification and recognition of each 
single work. 
 
II. COUNTRY VARIABLES, for a first geographical localization of the PPP. In this 
section some countries with a strong and enduring tradition in PPP realization, have 
been selected as main variables. As for example the Anglo-Saxon group represented 
by UK, USA, Canada and Australia. Spain and Netherlands are the only specific 
representatives of continental European countries.  
Finally there are two generic variables, which include all the other countries in 
Western Europe and around the World. 
As it could be easy to foresee large part of PPPs taken into account in this work, is 
born and developed in country with a long tradition with this kind of procurement, so 
it is not a case that the distribution of the cases through countries has a stronger 
representative in the UK and other Anglo-Saxon countries. In the case of the UK for 
example the impact of the PFI program has an historic impulse to PPP approach 
(Rosario M., et al, 2015).  Also for this reason we expect to see more positive result in 
PPP developed in countries that have already a funded tradition with PPP. Anyway the 
distribution is well pictured in the graph below.  
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Australia and UK with 20 out of 43 represent almost 50% of the total. In Europe, 
excluding the UK, the most frequent country in the research is Netherlands with 7 
complete cases. 
  
III. THE SECTOR OF APPLICATION OF EACH PPP, represents another general 
group of variables. As presented in the previous chapter, there are some typical sectors 
which traditionally attract PPP and these sectors are summed up in the following list 
of variables: 
 
ü Transport: this is historically the first sector of use in PPP (D. Grimsey and M.K. 
Lewis, 2004) and also for this reason it represents large part of the cases. Huge 
infrastructures as highway, toll road, bridges, but also secondary service structure and 
tunnels are some typical examples of infrastructures involved in this sector. In all 
these cases it is clear that the ability and competences of private party in design and 
build the structure may have a strong and effective impact on the final good realization 
of the project. 
Moreover, for this group of variables, we expect to find a direct link to the result-
variable of economic sustainability because we suppose that large part of them 
requires heavy financial resources for the realization. Especially in this case, private 
party should keep high quality standards for accountability and financial risk in order 
to effort such huge infrastructures. 
UK	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Spain	  7%	  
Netherlands	  16%	  
Other	  in	  Europe	  14%	  U.S.A	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  the	  world	  7%	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  in	  the	  countires-­‐variables	  	  
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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Another secondary link to “result-variable” in this sector, may be the environmental 
success, because every implementation and new infrastructure in transport field, 
should have the burden to improve the circulation of vehicles and consequently to 
reduce the level of CO2 emission deriving from traffic. 
 
ü Energy solution: in this group are included of course all the kinds of powerhouses, but 
also recycling centre and energy storages. Also for these infrastructures, private 
party’s competences in engineering may have a central role in the final realization of 
the project. 
Besides recent global awareness in theme of environmental sustainability of energy 
production has nowadays a strong impact also in the judge of PPP involved in this 
sector. So it is normal to expect a positive relationship between environmental 
sustainability of the project and its final success in this sector. 
 
ü Social commodities: this is probably the largest category taken into account for 
number of possible infrastructures and services, thanks to its large range of 
application: from hospitals to prisons, from schools to urban reclassification, in this 
field PPPs are always largely used.  
Post-construction managing has a stronger role than in the previous two categories 
because this kind of infrastructures needs a specialized and continuous managing. 
In this category all the result variables should be taken into account because of its 
large range of application. 
 
In the graph below it is possible to see the distribution of the cases taken into account. 
Transport and social commodities have the largest part of the cases (18 cases for the first 
variable and 21 for the second one), instead only four cases in this study are linked to 
infrastructures in the field of energy production. 
This tendency is anyway confirmed thanks to the large use and the solid tradition of PPP in 
the creation of transport and social infrastructures. In these fields, economic sustainability 
should be evident and positive. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION, actually it represents the largest part of the work in data 
collection, because through these variables the intent is to describe and identify as 
better as possible every single project. As it will be soon presented, these groups of 
variables cover some of the most important characteristics of PPP, in terms of time 
horizon, financial impact, bid form, governance, risk sharing, contractual or 
institutional framework, and specific form of PPP. 
Data has been collected as following: 
 
ü Contract type: the distinction in this case is represented by contractual and 
institutional PPP. As seen in the previous chapter (Table 1 in the first chapter) 
differences are evident, and their effects on the final result of the project may be as 
important as large. An institutional PPP generally is more integrated in the economic 
and social system of the country, it has a solid juridical base and public party supports 
it with special propose laws and in some cases also with direct subsidy. Private ability 
and economic effort are combined with a strong public presence. For this reason we 
expect to see a general good final result in this kind of procurement. 
On the other hand contractual PPP has on its nature a risky approach different from 
the previous. In this case in fact private party normally has the burden to assume a 
riskier position from a legal and economic point of view. Because essentially we 
suppose that the absence of institutional PPP implies that there is not (or it is in way 
of developing) a tested PPP approach in the country. Consequently public sector may 
Energy	  solution	  9%	  
Transport	  42%	  
Social	  commodities	  49%	  
Distribuition	  of	  Sectors	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be more adverse in supporting part of the financial effort of private party. The only 
juridical base for the entire work is the contract signed by the parties. 
This aspect is anyway balanced by the possibility to create a specific-project context 
by contractual PPP and in this way to create a more detailed and specialized legal 
framework. In other words, if the contract is well suited to the situation, it is possible 
to create a positive background for the partnership. 
From a statistical point of view, contractual PPP has a stronger presence in the data 
set because it represents the first choice for a partnership, for its utility. From a 
literature point of view, contractual PPP  is more frequent and it is easier to study and 
classify. The graph below reporting the findings of the research, confirms this 
tendency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ü Years of realization of the PPP: this is a mere time localization of the project. We 
choose to divide all PPPs taken in the analysis, in three chronological segments. From 
the first attempts of regulated PPP in the 80’s to the cases grew in the 90’s. The last 
segment is obviously represented by all the cases stipulated from 2000 to nowadays.  
The link with the result-variables is mixed, because these series of data have a more 
descriptive nature. Even though these aspects, it is anyway important to study the 
distribution of PPPs collected, to have a general impression of the period mainly 
pictured in this analysis.  
The graph below responds to this need and lets us to see that the stronger 
concentration of PPP analysed is developed and finished in the 2000’s (26 out of 43 
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cases).  This evidence is explicable thanks to the growing literature that starts to study 
the phenomenon of PPP from the beginning of the 2000‘s, in correspondence to the 
outbreak of the use of PPP worldwide.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ü Time horizon: as in the previous group of variables, even this group is referred to a 
time-variable, but actually it describes the duration of the PPP taken into account. It is 
divided in medium or long term contract, and the distinction is made if it lasts more or 
less than 25 years.  
The duration of the PPP may have various effects on the management of the whole life 
cycle of the project, and its influence on the final result of the project can be mixed. 
Anyway it is important to understand the duration of the partnership to have a better 
idea of the results obtained since the beginning of the project and to weigh the results 
to the duration of the PPP. 
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ü SPV ownership: this is a specific category composed by three variables. The first is 
the simple presence or neither of a special propose vehicle (SPV) in the PPP. As seen 
before in the work, some PPP grows up around the creation of this special kind of 
legal entity, which generally stops its legal life with the conclusion of the project. In 
order to specify the characteristics of the SPV, we choose to assign to this category, 
other two variables relating to the nature of the ownership. Two main situations have 
been taken into account: totally private SPV and partially private SPV. 
In both cases all the parties which enter in the SPV are collected in a “consortium” 
which can be composed totally by private firms or by private firms and public 
institutions. The aim is to cover all the phases of the PPP by collecting for each phase 
at least one specialized firm. 
In this study in particular, there is a first attempt to understand from which party 
derives the will to create the SPV and the impact of this choice in future successes or 
failures of the project.  
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ü Number of partners:  this couple of variables allow us to understand the complexity 
and the size of the project. PPP is generally based on a direct correlation between 
private party and public party, this is the case of simple PPP in which there are only 
these two parties involved. But especially for huge infrastructures and for extended 
contract, the realization of the project requires more than two main partners. 
University, banks and financial groups are only some examples of other kind of 
partners that may be necessary for the good realization of the PPP. 
This case is captured by the second variable: more than two parties. As it is possible 
to see from the graph below, the distribution of the cases is quite balanced, even 
because in some case it is difficult to understand fully the complexity of the PPP and 
not all the papers are focused on this particular aspect of the issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ü Risk allocation: as seen in the previous chapter, the issue of risk allocation between 
the parties is crucial for the final fine execution of the PPP. For this reason we 
identify two main variables related to this aspect: the most common form of risk 
management scheme is the public-private share. This particular form can assume 
infinite combinations of different distribution of each risk’s category.  
On the other side we have an extreme form of risk management: risk allocation 
totally on private party. 
As it is possible to see also from the graph below, the most common choice is to 
distribute all the risks between the two parties and only in alternative to entrust the 
risks on the private party. This series reflect one the most founded strength of the 
PPP: the distribution of risks lets the parties to have a better coverage in case of 
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difficulty and permits to create a positive allocation of each responsibilities and 
duties between the parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ü Forms of financing:  different forms of financing represent the first purely financial 
and economic set of variables.  
This group follows somehow the previous scheme of variables: there is a case in 
which both private both public parties finance the project and a second case in which 
private party is the only financier of the PPP.  
In the case of totally private financing we expect to see a positive correlation with 
the economic sustainability of the entire project thanks to the entrepreneurial aim of 
private party in PPP (A.M. Reynaers and S. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015). In fact with its 
own finance involved in the realization of the project, private party should be more 
precise and careful in respect to budgetary limits and it may be more prepared and 
specialised in managing this kind of situation.  
Clearly the other case, financing partially by the private sector, gives to the project 
another structure from this point of view, the financial help derives directly from the 
State, which can choose to sustain the project with direct finance or with subsidy. 
As it is possible to see in the graph below, in the cases analysed in this data set, the 
forms of financing are almost equally distributed in the two variables chosen. 
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ü Bundling level: this is the central part of the section because large part of the 
previous information can be summarized with the simple identification of the 
project and in other words, with its bundling level.  
In this set of variables it is possible to see a general classification of all the kinds of 
PPPs, for the description of each of them we refer to pg. 23 of this work. In this 
moment it is sufficient to underline the different nature of each PPP’s type. From 
the most complete and deep form of partnership (DBMFO) to its slight and hybrid 
form (service provision).  
Different forms of PPP entail different expectations in final result, so each of these 
variables may have a strong impact on the final result and the correlation with the 
result-variables can be mixed. 
The first evidence is the largest presence of PPPs like DBFO and DBMFO, which 
both represent a classical operative scheme, since they both start from design and 
they include financing and managing processes. This kind of PPP is one of the most 
used and complete forms. 
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ü Governance: this group represents another important set of variables and the only one 
specific also to post-construction period and management. 
The most common form of governance, in particular in huge infrastructure, is the 
“mixed-scheme” with a management composed in part by representatives of private 
party and in part by representatives of public party.  
The total private party governance with the supervision of a public party 
representative represents a variation of this system. 
In the cases observed in this work the distribution of these two variables is perfectly 
balanced between the two forms. Anyway it is important to underline that in this case, 
as in some other more specific variables, data taken from the papers not always is 
completed, because the governance of a PPP is not always object of study in every 
papers.  
Anyway it is clear that the management of the infrastructure may vary significantly in 
relationship to these forms governance, and it can be itself a strong variable for the 
success or the failure of a PPP.  
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ü Bid shape:  bidding process represents the most important aspect of a PPP’s starting. 
Three different forms of bids are included in this set of variables. 
The first and probably the most common is the public bid with a selection of one 
winner. The choice is normally made for specified standards of quality of the project, 
value for money and warranties. With the same method, the bid can be lunched to a 
limited numbers of private companies or it can be made exclusively to one private party.  
Clearly this last form lets public party to address its request to a best-wanted bidder, so 
we expect for this situation the achievement of the goals researched. 
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V. ARTICLE SPECIFICATION, this part of the analysis is created for examining in 
depth the characteristics of the paper from which each data is extrapolated. It is 
composed by only two groups of variables. They are presented as following: 
 
ü Year of publication:  it is simply the year of publication of the paper, in order to 
prove if the paper has an historical point of view of the PPP, or if it has a 
contemporary look at the phenomenon. 
Articles chosen for the analysis are on average quite recent; in fact the mean of the 
year of publication is 2009. So they all present a modern point of view of PPP and 
the large majority of the empirical cases are developed between ‘90s and ‘00s. 
 
ü Type of Journal: this set of variables declares the nature of the paper. We distinguish 
at least three big categories of journal: economics, managerial and 
planning/urbanization. Obviusly this distinction is based on different approaches that 
each paper gives to the PPP analysed inside. With an economics paper we expect to 
have more information about the economic sustainabilty of the project.  
A managerial paper could give a more focused view on the real management of the 
project, or some detailed examples of risk management or finally, some about the 
phases of bid and administration. 
The last type of journal can appear as more architectural, but it generally gives a lot 
of information about environmental sustainability and the global social impact of the 
project on the country. All these information are crucial for establishing the success 
or insuccess of every single PPP. 
Here below we have the distribution of the paper analysed by the type of journal.  
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VI. PROJECT’S RESULT, this is the last category of variables chosen for this work, but 
it is the cornerstone of the entire analysis because with this set of variables, it is 
possible to understand if the project has (or had, if it is already concluded) responded 
positively to the “need” that is at the base of every partnership. 
The nature of this set of variables is a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
They are all based on the authors’ opinion or research. The judge on the utility and the 
efficiency of an infrastructure can be qualitative, instead if the project is interrupted 
for a financial crisis, the failure is clear besides the author’s opinion.  
For this aim, four variables have been selected: 
 
ü Social sustainability: to analyse the impact of medium and large infrastructures 
in urban and social system. This very complex and large field of study allows a 
lot of specific points of analysis.  
First of all this variable tries to test the real social utility of the project. As told 
largely before in the text, all PPPs are created for responding to a “need” in 
public policy and welfare and this need has to be filled by the success in the 
realization of the infrastructure (S. Verweij, 2015). New hospitals have to work 
correctly and maintain high standards of quality for the wealth of its patients, 
new roads have to facilitate the circulation in the area of realization, and so on. 
Some secondary analyses are contended in this set of variables anyway, 
because new infrastructures create effects not only for their users, but also for 
external users (P. M. Panayedes et al., 2014). So it is important to analyse the 
impact of the realization of these infrastructures or services also in the social 
texture around them. Some specific aspects linked to this issue can be: the 
impact of the project in local and external job occupation, the integration of the 
structure with the existing social background and the facilities of use and 
admission to the new service (D. Chung et al., 2009). 
PPPs in which all these aspects or at least one of them are underlined and 
confirmed, have been selected as a positive example of success in social 
sustainability. 
 
ü Economic sustainability: central role in the success of the PPP is clearly the 
economic viability of the project. One of the first causes of failure or delay is 
the end of capitals or the wrong evaluation of the financial exposure (M. A. 
Soomro et X. Zhang, 2015).  So it is natural to think about this variable as an 
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“economic rating” of the project. Financial structure, costs analysis, budget 
limits, are only few methods used by the authors of the papers with the aim of 
studying PPP from a pure economic point of view.  
If budgetary standards are respected and financial estimates were sufficiently 
correct in the first phases of the realization of a PPP and if above all, the return 
of the investment is effective and lets private party to manage efficiently the 
structure, the project can be considered a success in economic sustainability. 
 
ü Environmental sustainability:  this aspect covers a central role in projects that 
grow in deep correlation with environment. Climate change, clean energy and 
recycling centre are some key words related to this field (K. Eckerberg et al, 
2015). 
When a PPP is finished complying with these values, the project can be 
associated to a success in environmental sustainability. 
 
ü Innovation: a PPP brings innovation to the area in which is developed, when 
new technologies have been tested and used successfully for its realization or 
when in the period of managing, the infrastructure allows the users to research 
and find a new technology. 
Other important fields of innovation may be the use of a new legal framework 
for the realization of new PPP or a new way of managing an infrastructure. So 
in general when something in the realization of the partnership is changed and 
when this change implicates a possible future adaptation of the same new 
method in other PPPs. 
 
Now, from a numeric point of view, the graph below shows us that large part of the PPP taken 
into account for this analysis, has had at least one evidence in the result-variable, with two 
peaks in social and economic sustainability (29 out of 43 in the first case, and 27 out of 43 in 
the second case). What appears from the research is that some cases achieved three of these 
results, but none arrives to reach all the four results. A smaller part of them achieved positive 
results in environmental and innovation field (9 out of 43 for the first case and 12 out of 43 
for the second).  
The distribution of these results suggests us a first conclusion. On one side the focus of 
specialized paper is clearly oriented to analyse the two “primary” tests of the PPP, which are 
naturally the social utility and the economic impact and sustainability.  
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On the other side evident manifestations of environmental success and innovation are possible 
only if the project is directly oriented to achieve this kind of results. As seen before with the 
introduction of the sector variables, large part of the cases analysed in this data set is linked to 
transport and social commodities. So it is evident that for example, a PPP agreed for the 
construction of a new prison, has to respond first to the social utility of the structure. Instead a 
particular recycling centre may have as primary objective the environmental sustainability of 
the project. 
Another important characteristic of this data set is that some cases reached negative results in 
these categories, and for this reason, this set of variables is the only that includes also the 
“negative” effect. As it will possible to see later in the text, all the variables presented above, 
are reported in the table as dummy variable with two possible values (0 and 1), but only in 
this case the dummy can assume three values (1 for the success, 0 if the data is not observed 
by the paper, and -1 if the PPP failed in that specific field).  
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2.4 Literature summary 	  
Literature and its choice is clearly the cornerstone of this work. Theory about PPP, its history, 
its implementation, could be only a way to describe the phenomenon, but not a way to 
understand fully the impact of some characteristics on each project. For this reason we choose 
to collect a series of different papers for the analysis which will be soon presented. 
The first big choice was made in the direction of infrastructure PPPs. In other words the 
analysis is based on projects, which have the creation of an infrastructure or the management 
of it, as the principal objective. A lot of papers describing exclusively the service provision of 
a PPP have been excluded. Instead others, which describe the process with a good level of 
focus, have been included.  
It is important to remember that the large number of variables used for the data-set is probably 
the first reason of the relatively small number of papers used in confront of the total number 
of papers have been searched. At least four out of five papers were excluded for these two 
reasons: lack of information or out of theme. 
With this premise, it is normal to expect a large variability in the literature used. Some papers 
like “Transparency in public–private partnerships: not so bad after all?” (A. M. Reynaers 
and S.Rimmelikhuijsen, 2015) and “Using contracts to promote sustainable complex urban 
projects” (M. Van der Veen and W. K. K. Altes, 2015), represent clearly a kind of work with 
a precise urban planning view. These kinds of papers are perfect for analysing the impact of 
the PPP in the social and environmental contexts: if the infrastructure was really necessary 
and if its construction respects precise environmental laws. Besides they generally offer an 
accurate description of PPPs with high level of bundling, because these partnerships include 
also the design and construction phases that are for definition the most important issue for an 
urbanization focus. 
Another big distinction, which appears from the selection of the papers, is that one regarding 
pure economics papers and managerial papers. The difference between these two categories is 
well defined by the presence in each of them of some typical arguments used for each 
analysis.  
Economics papers use balance sheets, financial exposures, economic indexes on investments, 
and generally the PPPs’ analysis is spotted on the economic equilibrium of the partnership. 
They keep the focus on the return on investment for both public and private parties, because 
the fundamental point of economic sustainability for PPPs is clearly the necessity of 
absorbing the initial investment and respecting the limits of the contract in terms of time and 
budget. The best examples in this sense could be the papers “A critical financial analysis of 
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the Private Finance Initiative: selecting a financing method or allocating economic wealth?” 
written by Jean Shaoul (2003) and the critical paper “Driving Alone- Sydney’s Cross City 
Tunnel” by Peter Phibbs (2007). The first one assumes a financial methodology for analysing 
the impact of the construction of new hospitals in the UK under project finance, and the 
second one testifies the negative result in terms of economic sustainability of the project of 
Sydney’s Cross City Tunnel. In both of these examples, authors reveal a deep economic aim 
on their works, with the use of specific tools they reach the goal of “testing” the PPP under an 
economic review. Clearly these kinds of papers focus their attention on our more economic 
variables, like financial structure and SPV. 
Managerial papers instead are probably the widest kind of paper. This characteristic is the 
consequence of the strategic importance of management in the entire process of a PPP. 
Starting form the bid, passing through risk allocation and arriving to the composition of the 
governance, management has a strong weight on every partnership. So it is natural that 
managerial papers have the highest impact on the determination on the variables used for this 
data set.   
Perfect examples in this field are the papers “Alternative Contractual Arrangements for 
Urban Light Rail Systems: Lessons from Two Case Studies” written by Carlos Oliveira Cruz 
(2014) and “Risk allocation in the private provision of public infrastructure” by A. Ng and 
Martin Loosemore (2006). In both works there is a strong managerial component which 
allows us to understand fully the case studies present in the text in particular for what 
concerns government and bid process in the first case, and risk allocation in the second one. 
Finally some works has not only one specific aim, but rather they are a mix of the three 
different aspects previously presented. Anyway if they are part of the selection, it means that 
they present enough information to complete most of the variables requested. 
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3. Results and comments 
 
3.1 Presentation of the data included in the model 	  
 
This final section of the work is dedicated to the explanation of the statistical analysis and its 
final results. Before commenting what derives from the analysis, it is useful to explain some 
decisions made in the regression. 
As we told before, we choose to apply a logit-regression model to the data set and even if this 
choice may be natural because of the large presence of dummy variables, it forces us to make 
some simplification of the data set. In fact we decide to gather some variables, which have too 
infrequent observations, in order to avoid possible bias and to amplify the precision of the 
regression.  
This operation is summed in the following table including the variables as they have been 
used for the regression: 
 
Table 6: variables used for the meta-regression analysis 
uk_australia 
This is the first simplification made. This group includes the 
cases of PPPs developed in these two countries. We gather UK 
and Australia because they present some typical and similar 
features in the economic and legal background for PPP, and 
because they represent the majority of the cases taken into 
account (46% of the total). 
 
Transport 
In this group are included only the cases of transport 
infrastructures, instead the other two categories (energy 
solutions and social commodities) have been considered 
together. This choice is similar to the previous one: great 
tradition of PPP in transport sector and higher presence of this 
kind of infrastructure in the cases analysed. 
 
Contractualppp 
This is the variable of contractual PPP, in opposition to 
institutional PPP. This division does not pass through any 
simplification. 
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2000’s PPPs started after 2000 have been included in this group. 
Mediumterm 
PPPs made with contractual duration of more than 25 years. This 
division does not pass through any simplification. 
 
SPV 
This variable includes the presence of a SPV in the partnership. 
 
pub_priv_spv 
This variable includes the possible scenario of a SPV made in 
part by private companies and in part by public sector. 
 
more_two_partners 
This variable studies the impact of a partnership if essentially 
more than two partners make it. In opposition to the case of a 
strict PPP developed by only two distinctive partners. 
 
shared_risk 
This variable includes the possibility to afford the PPP by 
sharing the risk. The opposite case is the possibility to have a 
PPP in which only private party assumes all the risks. 
 
whole_priv_funds 
This variable includes a total-private financing scenario, in 
opposition to a shared financial position between private and 
public parties. 
 
high_bundling 
This is the third big simplification. In this important group have 
been included all the most integrated PPPs, in other words, all 
the cases in which the partnership starts with the design of the 
infrastructure and finishes with the managing of it (DFOMT for 
example). Other simpler cases (BOT for example) are not 
included in this group. 
 
mixed_governance 
This variable includes the possibility to have governance 
composed by representatives of both private both public parties. 
 
publicbid 
If the PPP is made by lunching a public bid, this case is included 
in this variable, in opposition to other two cases, gathered 
together: bid limited to a specific number of participants and bid 
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For each of these variables some typical regression parameters are reported in the following 
tables (table 7 and table 8). Coefficient is the first one. It describes the direct relationship 
between the variable taken into account and the result variable. It is higher when this 
relationship is stronger and statistically proved. It can assume positive or negative values, in 
relationship with a positive or a negative impact of observations to the final PPP’s result. 
Standard Error instead is the general degree of the deviation of the sampling distribution made 
in the data set. It describes the “distance” between observations and the regression model. 
Z-test (or simply z) is the ratio between the previous two parameters (coefficient and standard 
error) and it describes the approximation by a normal distribution of the original distribution, 
under the null hypothesis. It takes higher values when the distribution is statistically 
significant. Instead when it is close to the 0, it means that particular variable may be 
statistically insignificant. 
P > z is the consequence of the previous value and it represents the area under a Normal 
distribution, in which the value of z or one more extreme is probably to observe. The final 
two parameters are clearly linked together and they take, with a 95% confidence interval, the 
maximum deviation of the distribution to the regression model. At the end of each tables there 
are other parameters, which complete the composition of each result-table. The most 
important is surely the Log likelihood. This parameter estimates the statistical inference of the 
variables taken for the analysis, and it will be soon important in the text to understand the 
significance of some choices made in phase of comments. Finally the number of observations 
and other three parameters linked to Log likelihood are reported in conclusion of the analysis.  
The following two tables are the summary of this part of the text, they are the result of the 
processing of the data set with a logit-regression model and their results will be explained in 
the second part of the chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
aimed to one private company. 
_cons 
It is not a variable linked to an observation data set, but it 
estimates the general distribution of the previous variables, in 
order to establish a “global view” of the regression. 
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Table	  7	  results	  for	  variable	  env_soc	  	  	  
Environmental and/or 
social sustainability Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
uk_australia -21,231 3.956,573 -0,01 0,996 -7.775,972 7.733,510 
transport -1,361 1,482 -0,92 0,358 -4,266 1,543 
contractualppp 2,032 1,895 1,07 0,284 -1,682 5,746 
2000's -0,407 1,515 -0,27 0,788 -3,376 2,562 
mediumterm -0,719 1,628 -0,44 0,659 -3,909 2,472 
spv 20,195 3.956,574 0,01 0,996 -7.734,547 7.774,937 
pub_priv_svp -20,466 3.956,574 -0,01 0,996 -7.775,208 7.734,275 
more_two_partners 1,892 0,186 1,02 0,308 -1,747 5,531 
shared_risk -1,941 2,093 -0,93 0,354 -6,043 2,160 
whole_priv_funds 18,921 3.956,573 0 0,996 -7.735,820 7.773,662 
high_bundling 0,216 1,479 0,15 0,884 -2,683 3,116 
mixed_governance -1,443 1,980 -0,73 0,466 -5,323 2,437 
publicbid -0,385 1,452 -0,26 0,791 -3,230 2,461 
_cons 3,285 3,135 1,05 0,295 -2,860 9,430 	  
Note to table:  
The number of observations is 43.  
Log likelihood = -13.273464 
LR chi2(13) = 17,57; Prob> chi2 = 0,1744; Pseudo R2 = 0,3983. 
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Table	  8	  results	  for	  variable	  Economic	  sustainability	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Note to table:  
Number of observations is 43.  
Log Likelihood = -12.917079 
LR chi2(13) = 29,78. Prob> chi2 = 0,0051. Pseudo R2 = 0,5355. 	  
Economic sustainability Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
uk_australia -5,600 2,931 -1,910 0,056 -11,345 0,146 
transport 1,984 1,895 1,050 0,295 -1,729 5,698 
contractualppp 4,928 2,656 1,860 0,064 -0,277 10,134 
2000's 0,632 1,566 0,400 0,687 -2,438 3,701 
mediumterm 3,106 2,065 1,500 0,133 -0,941 7,153 
spv 7,206 3,540 2,040 0,042 0,267 14,144 
pub_priv_svp -7,296 3,557 -2,050 0,04 -14,267 -0,325 
more_two_partners 3,949 2,129 1,860 0,064 -0,223 8,122 
shared_risk 2,723 2,490 1,090 0,274 -2,158 7,604 
whole_priv_funds 3,925 2,350 1,670 0,095 -0,681 8,530 
high_bundling -0,671 1,544 -0,430 0,664 -3,698 2,355 
mixed_governance -2,433087 2,363357 -1,03 0,303 -7,065182 2,199008 
publicbid -4,543566 2,304696 -1,97 0,049 -9,060688 -0,02644 
_cons -5,381236 4,570139 -1,18 0,239 -14,33854 3,576071 
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3.2 Discussion of results 
 
Before talking about each single result arising from the tables above, it is fundamental to have 
a first investigation about the four macro-result areas and their implication on the regression.  
This necessity is due the fact that not every “target variable” has had a clear evidence, and 
actually only the economic sustainability has, on its results, an evidence that lets us to 
complete the analysis with a significant comment.  
A first general motivation can be given by the strong presence, in the papers analysed, of 
economic or managerial works (both together correspond to 26 out of 43 cases). Naturally in 
this kind of literature, the general structure of the analysis and the point of view of the 
comment, are based on an economic view. So it is normal to expect a stronger relationship 
between our “control or moderator variables” and the economic result variable. 
On the other hand positive results like social and environmental sustainability, and 
innovation, are more difficult to observe and to judge objectively. This tendency is supported 
by some statistical evidence: in 27 cases out of 43 analysed, economic sustainability is 
reported to be a positive success, instead innovation and environmental sustainability for 
example, combined together have been noted only in 21 cases (9 for environmental 
sustainability and 12 for innovation). 
For passing over this initial consideration, we decide to gather together the results of 
environmental and social sustainability. What rises from this choice, is the group env_soc, 
which results are summed up in the first table of this chapter (table 1)2. Even though this 
choice, that could reinforce the weakness of both result variables, results are anyway 
statistically contradictory and weak. 
In fact from a statistical point of view, it is possible to support the same reasons by using the 
tables previously reported. The first evidence is the strong insignificance in particular of some 
observations taken in the env_soc table.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Innovation target has the same impact on the regression, and its results have not been reported in the text, 
because they would be useless for the goal of this section. The process of data set made for this variable has been 
anyway important to understand the different variables’ weight on each result-variables.	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Table	  9	  focus	  on	  the	  env_soc	  bias	  
env_soc Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95%Conf. Interval] 
  
uk_australia -21,231 3.956,573 -0,01 0,996 -7.775,972 7.733,510 
spv 20,195 3.956,574 0,01 0,996 -7.734,547 7.774,937 
pub_priv_svp -20,466 3.956,574 -0,01 0,996 -7.775,208 7.734,275 
whole_priv_funds 18,921 3.956,573 0 0,996 -7.735,820 7.773,662 
 
These four variables have been taken for example for their high deviation from the regression 
model imposed for this analysis. Coefficient and standard error are both too critical, and z-test 
is even worst, because it is evidently close to 0 (in the case of whole_priv_funds is just 0, but 
it is a simplification of the program, anyway it testifies the same problem). 
Some other variables included in the same table have not the same inconsistency 
(contractualppp and more_two_partners have good evidence also in this table), but it is clear 
from these examples that talking about the relationship between the moderator variables and 
the PPP’s result in environment or social sustainability can be approximate in this analysis. 
Besides these numerical explanation, there is another theoretical reason: economic 
sustainability is probably the most objective target variable, and consequently the only 
variable in which negative and positive results are clear and out of contradiction. 
The first aspect was explained before in this work, but anyway it is easily understandable: 
budgetary standards, financial exposures, return on investment, are only few econometric 
instruments that gives to the economist a precise method to judge the economic structure of a 
PPP and eventually to understand the degree of the failure or of the success. 
Instead for other result variables, the same process is more difficult. Starting from the 
different approach to the estimation of a success in social or environmental fields: or it is 
exclusively the opinion of the author or it is the result of the collection of some interviews. In 
both cases it is difficult to have a realistic judgment of the partnership.  
This general consideration is supported also by the different values that the parameter Log 
likelihood has in the two tables: for economicsustainability it takes the value of 12.91, for 
env_soc instead has the value of 13.27. This difference, even if minimum, testifies a stronger 
statistical inference in the first model, and consequently higher levels of dependability in its 
variables. 
In conclusion of this issue, leaving the side of result-variables, another consideration lets us to 
understand why only economic sustainability has strong evidence in the regression analysis. 
This reason is based on the characteristics of the moderator variables. For responding to the 
general aim of this work, that is clearly marked with an economic planning, the choice of 
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these variables was made in support of an economic analysis, so it is not a surprise that these 
variables do perfectly their job, by giving us a good response on the analysis of economic 
sustainably, but by contrast, they do not reach the same objective as well for the other three 
target variables. 
Probably the integration with more specific variables also for the analysis in these three fields 
(social, innovation and environment) could give us a more total look of PPP. Anyway the 
results that will be explained immediately after in the text, support the good realization of the 
data set and the good choice of the paper analysed. Variables like bid process, financial 
structure, governance and risk allocation give us the possibility to structure a complete and 
statistically correct, economic review of PPP. 
In few words, from a statistical point of view, this work, starting from the research of the 
papers, and arriving to the statistical analysis, responds to a specific economic review of the 
phenomenon. Besides it offers just a general look of the impact of the same characteristics to 
other three big issues of PPP: social, environmental and innovation. With this approach it is 
possible to elaborate a correct interpretation of the data, and to better understand the impact of 
some aspects of a PPP to its final success. 
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3.3 Comments to the results 
 
This final part of the work is a key component in the description of PPP and it includes the 
most relevant considerations and interpretation of the phenomenon.  
As described before economic sustainability is the only target variable statistically solid, and 
the following table includes only the variables with a good deviation from the regression. In 
other words they represent the only variables that can be interpreted with precision. 
 
Table	  10:	  focus	  on	  the	  most	  significant	  variables	  of	  ecnomicsustainability	  
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95%Conf. Interval] 
  
uk_australia -5,600 2,931 -1,910 0,056 -11,345 0,146 
contractualppp 4,928 2,656 1,860 0,064 -0,277 10,134 
spv 7,206 3,540 2,040 0,042 0,267 14,144 
pub_priv_svp -7,296 3,557 -2,050 0,04 -14,267 -0,325 
more_two_partners 3,949 2,129 1,860 0,064 -0,223 8,122 
whole_priv_funds 3,925 2,350 1,670 0,095 -0,681 8,530 
publicbid -4,543566 2,304696 -1,97 0,049 -9,060688 -0,0264444 
 
 
The first result (uk_australia) is probably the most contradictory, in fact from the analysis 
emerges a negative relationship between PPP made in UK or Australia, and a positive 
economic result. This data is probably derived from four negative evidences in economic 
results, in three different cases of Australian PPP. One of these is probably the most important 
example of failure that we analysed in the data set. It is the case of Sydney’s Cross City 
Tunnel (Phibbs P., 2007;Siemiatycki M., 2009), a huge transport infrastructure in the heart of 
Sydney. This partnership represents a failure because of the under-estimation of the cars flow 
and the consequent low return on investment. The management of the infrastructure changed 
several times for financial complications, and even though the structure represents a brilliant 
example of architecture and engineering, the project was deeply criticized by mass media and 
specialized papers. Phibbs (2007, pg. 1) introduces his analysis to this PPP with these words: 
“The cross city tunnel in Sydney has been a fairly spectacular failure as a Public Private 
Partnership – the operating company has gone into receivership less than 2 years after the 
tunnel opening in August 2005. The tunnel, built at a cost of about $800 million failed to 
attract the traffic required to meet interest payments.” 
This negative result is amplified by other two cases (A. Ng and M. Loosemore, 2007), which 
help to understand the negative correlation between uk_australia and economicsustainability. 
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Actually this evidence does not mean that PPPs are made with higher economic standards in 
other countries, but it rather means that literature, for the cases studied in these two countries, 
is more expanded and in some terms more incisive. 
Anyway this data should not be underestimated, because it underlines that also in other 
countries, out of the UK and Australia, PPPs increase their range of use and they are always 
better in terms of economic standards and sustainability. 
All these considerations are naturally supported by the values reported in the previous table, 
where the variable uk_australiahas a good z-test value (-1,91) and low probability to have 
P>z (5,6%), these results, combined together, testifies a solid statistical evidence that allows 
us to complete the comment for this aspect. 
The following evidence is probably more interesting and it deals with the importance of 
contractual PPP in confront of institutional PPP. What we can understand from the table is 
that contractual PPP has more probability to arrive to a positive economic result rather than 
institutional PPP. The relationship is explained by the positive coefficient calculated (4,98) 
and by some reasons previously exposed. Surely contractual PPP has, for its nature, a stronger 
provision for budgetary limits, financial duties and time limit so the private company has the 
burden to face the partnership only if it sure to respect the contract. Besides contractual PPP is 
perfect for small or medium projects, in which the contract can assume a central role for 
defining each obligation and eventually for specifying responsibilities and risks. Standard 
error and z-test are similar to the previous case (2,656 for the first parameter and 1,86 for the 
second one), both of them define a good approximation of the model to observations. 
Another expected result is that one related to SPV (special propose vehicle) and its 
composition. As it is understandable form the table the presence of a SPV increase the 
possibility of arriving to good economic results (7,206 is the coefficient), and this evidence is 
even better if the SPV is composed entirely by private companies. This last element is 
supported by the result of the variable pub_priv_svpwhich studies the impact of SPV 
composed partially by private and public parties. It reports a negative correlation (coefficient 
of -7,269) and consequently it stresses the importance of having a total private SPV for the 
positive final execution of the PPP from an economic point of view. 
Private consortium in this sense is the typical approach of a PPP, because it is the most 
complete form for assuming all the different phases of a partnership (Carbonara et al., 2013). 
Typically firms with specific tasks coexist in the SPV in order to complete each steps 
requested in the PPP, from the design of the infrastructure to the managing.  
The following result is strongly expected: the positive correlation between economic 
sustainability and the presence in the partnership of more than two distinctive partners (with 
	   73	  
coefficient 3,949). This result is explained by the fact that having more than two partners 
allows the participants to manage in a better way in particular three important steps of a PPP: 
risk allocation, activities distribution and financial exposures. “The right assignment to the 
right party” may be the slogan of this consideration. In fact with only two partners there is the 
negative possibility to observe an overloaded of duties and risks on the shoulder of only one 
party. Instead with higher number of partners, a balanced distribution may help the 
management of the project to complete the partnership in respect to economic limits.  
Anyway it is clear that having more than two partners can help to arrive to a good realization 
of the PPP (and actually this is the evidence deriving from our analysis), but it is not enough. 
It is necessary a good organization and a calculated distribution of each components. An 
example in this sense is represented by the case study of London Underground (D. Currie and 
P. Teague, 2015). In this case the presence of more than two partners was forced by the huge 
dimension of the project (the extension of one line of London Underground).  
This case is weel supported by the following diagram, which shows the complexity of the 
PPP and in which way this complexity was distribueted throug the parties. 
 
 
  
Figure	  6	  	  London	  Underground	  PPP	  parties'	  structure	  
Source:	  D. Currie and P. Teague, 2015, pg 247. 
	   74	  
The most important result regarding the financial structure is represented by the parameter 
whole_priv_funds, which reports a positive correlation with economic sustainability (the 
coefficient is 3,925). It shows that PPPs have a better probability to arrive to a positive 
economic result if the financial exposure is totally on the hand of a private party. This 
consideration is supported by the idea at the base of PPP, which is the great responsibility that 
derives from assuming the whole financial commitment of the project by private party. This 
burden brings the private party to place higher attention on economic results, respect 
budgetary limits, and fulfil financial exposures. All these economic aspects combined 
together increase the probability to achieve a good final results. 
The last parameter analysed is the publicbid, which shows a negative correlation with 
economic sustainability (the coefficient is -4,5435). Like in the first case (uk_australia) the 
negative correlation is the other side of a positive correlation that in this case in particular is 
more interesting. It is the case of other two kinds of bid, which offer a higher probability to 
achieve a positive economic result in the PPP: bid for a limited number of participants and bid 
aimed to one private company. 
This result can be explained by the high level of specificity of some PPP and the level of 
economic and quality standards required for some infrastructures. The lack of proper control 
in public bids can lead to dispersive processes and to the risk of entrustment of important 
project to inadequate companies. Instead the other two ways allows a preventive selection of 
the candidates, and a dedicated attention in assigning the project to a well-structured bid 
winner. 
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Conclusions 	  	  
Empirical analysis has perfectly confirmed the complexity of PPPs. This characteristic is 
mainly due to the long-term development of the partnerships and to the intricacy of their 
internal mechanisms. The high number of variables, which deeply influence the global result 
of a partnership, makes the analyses difficult and in some cases even contradictory. For these 
reasons, we have run a meta-analysis on the available evidence.  
This analysis has shown that a number of variables have a positive influence on the likelihood 
that the PPP delivers good results in terms of economic sustainability. Most of these variables 
are related to the degree of involvement of the private partner in the PPP. The more the 
private party is involved in the different stages of the PPP and the more private capital is used, 
the more the PPP is likely to bring positive economic results. On the other hand, the analysis 
has shown that economic-related variables do not have any correlation with the likelihood that 
the PPP delivers social or environmental sustainability or innovation.  
This is probably due to the fact that these variables are likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic 
features of PPPs, which are not easily captured by the variables that we have tried to define 
with respect to the case analyzed. More research is needed to understand the reason of the 
good social and environmental performance of PPPs, which can be the object of more specific 
researches.  	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